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In A History of Spaces, John Pickles notes how some of the ideologically-
loaded representational norms of mapping are well known, such as the orientation of 
maps with north at the top and the continued use of the Mercator projection (2004). 
Others are less familiar, including what Pickles calls ‘the focus of mapping 
convention on natural and built physical objects, rather than developing universal 
conventions dealing with symbol, affect or movement’ (2004: 57). However, since 
May 2000, when the US Government ended its purposeful degradation of the 
consumer global positioning system (GPS) signal which it had enforced for reasons of 
national security, the mapping of movement has been an area of considerable and 
ongoing artistic activity, and features as a significant aspect of a genre of new media 
art practice known as locative media (Hemment 2006; Tuters and Varnelis 2006; 
O’Rourke 2013; Pinder 2013; Zeffiro 2012). One artist working with GPS and traces 
of movement has also addressed cartography’s blind spot of affect, incorporating an 
entirely different type of trace into his mapping practice. Christian Nold’s long-
running Bio Mapping project (2004–ongoing) is a series of self-contained 
participatory mapping projects, all of which involve the combination of location with 
physiological data from a sensor that measures galvanic skin response (GSR), that is, 
changes in the conductivity of the skin of the subject’s fingers caused by the level of 
their sweat (2009a; 2011 [‘Bio Mapping’]). Nold has likened the resulting 
visualisations to a ‘cardiogram put across the landscape’ (Nold and Bentkowska-Kafel 
2006). GSR has been used as index of arousal by scientists researching emotions and 
affective responses since the late nineteenth century (Joyce and Baker 2008). 
Separately from this – although sometimes drawing on empirical science for 
legitimation – there has also been a resurgence of academic interest in affect and 
emotion (and the distinction between them) within the humanities, evident from the 
mid-1990s onwards. In what follows, I will be drawing on the Deleuzian/Spinozan 
concept of affect employed in a strand of this writing, and particularly on an 
influential essay by the philosopher Brian Massumi which works, on the level of 
rhetoric at least, to link affective science to the cultural theory which shares its name 
(Massumi 2002).1
Nold’s project blends traces of the body’s internal states with the traces 
produced by locomotive movement. This article considers this blending of traces, and 
the implications of a conflating a Deleuzian/Spinozan concept of affect with a 
framework derived from affective science. I will argue that one consequence is an 
erasure of the distinction between the two bodily phenomena being traced, and I will 
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consider the role of a strategic scientism, evident in both Nold’s and Massumi’s 
handling of affect.
Tools for Crowds
Nold has a background in political activism, and while his work with participatory 
mapping has largely been funded and conducted (in the UK, at least) in the broad 
context of New Labour’s instrumentalisation of socially engaged art,2 he has worked 
to retain a critical and reflexive attitude to both the basic conceptual elements of that 
practice (concepts like ‘participation’ and ‘community’)3 and to the technology that is 
at the heart of his work. His practice is concerned with both the production of 
practical tools for the representation of social collectives, and also with stimulating 
critical dialogues about technology more broadly, including the imaginaries that are 
stimulated by, projected onto and bound up with the development of new 
technologies.
In his work prior to Bio Mapping, the collectives with which Nold dealt were 
political crowds. One work from this period prefigures an interest in visualising the 
traces of moving bodies: Crowd Compiler (2004–5) is software art, an application that 
sequentially processes images taken at regular intervals by a fixed camera, 
compositing all the visual changes between the images and making them 
simultaneously visible. Essentially a chronophotography for crowds, Crowd Compiler 
sought to create images that captured their changing, temporal and mobile aspects. As 
Nold put it, ‘most representations of the crowd aim to rationalise and quantify the 
crowd rather than show its dynamics of both density and fluidity. The Crowd 
Compiler software tries to present the “crowd in time” rather than a static snapshot’ 
(2011 [‘Crowd Compiler’]). A composite digital photograph produced using the 
Crowd Compiler application was exhibited along with a computer running the 
software at Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel’s 2005 Making Things Public exhibition at 
the Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie Karlsruhe.
An essay written by Nold for the catalogue places his application in the 
context of long-standing problems with the representation of crowds in political 
discourse and their legitimacy in the eyes of legal authorities as expressions of public 
political will (2005). Nold starts his account with the ‘earliest known photographs of a 
political crowd’, images which he states ‘indicate a turning point in the relationship 
between politics, representation and authority’: two daguerreotypes taken of the 
Chartist meeting on Kennington Common in London, on 10 April 1848 (2005: 846). 
The image exhibited in Making Things Public was also taken at this location. Nold 
relates the problems the Chartists met in trying to get their petition recognised by 
Parliament and describes controversies over the number of signatures, with the counts 
conducted by the organisers and government differing widely.4 He draws parallels 
with the protest held on 15 February 2003 against the then-impending invasion of 
Iraq, a demonstration which is generally acknowledged as the largest such event in 
British history. Figures varied then also, with the Metropolitan Police claiming 
750,000 protestors and the Stop the War Coalition claiming up to two million (2005: 
852). Nold describes the different statistical and observational techniques used by 
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different parties in London and elsewhere on that day: for official and some media 
estimates, these involved the use of aerial photographic data. However, Nold’s Crowd 
Compiler is not intended as a more accurate way of counting heads: in his essay’s 
conclusion he criticises the reductiveness of ‘the crowd-number discourse’ (2005: 
853), something of which all parties are guilty.
Nold’s essay closes with a call for a more nuanced version of collective 
representation, and although Crowd Compiler is the model he is proposing, his last 
words on the subject describe a synoptic visuality far more like a bottom-up 
cartography than the digital chronophotography produced by his application:
Today, this view of power has been placed in the hands of those with the 
necessary imaging technology. Fortunately, there is a whole movement of 
bottom-up media technologists who are developing new communication 
and representation technologies. Instead of rushing home from a 
demonstration to have our own subjective experience validated by the 
mainstream media, these new strains of technology hint at ways to attain 
our own consensual God’s-eye view. (Nold, 2005: 853)
Although Crowd Compiler cannot be considered a locative media artwork, in 
their survey of the genre Marc Tuters and Kazys Varnelis use it to illustrate the 
rationale of that strand of locative media practice concerned with tracing movement 
(2006). In turning to locative media, Nold would develop a tool that combines the 
embodied, subjective experience of the individual at street level with the God’s-eye 
view of GPS.
Performative Mapping and Paper Maps
Nold’s Bio Mapping device patches together two technological objects. GSR sensors 
register the skin resistance of the participants, passing a small current through the skin 
of their hands via finger cuffs. The level of sweat increases the rate of conductance, 
and this provides a measurable parameter relating to the internal state of the 
participant. Nold is concerned with short-term peaks and dips in the GSR reading; he 
states that ‘the assumption is that these changes are an indication of “emotional” 
intensity’ (2009c: 3). Indeed, as mentioned above, GSR has been used in scientific 
studies into emotion for over a hundred years (Joyce and Baker 2008).
Most of the large mapping projects Nold has undertaken using this device 
have been titled Emotion Maps,5 and he has published an anthology of critical and 
technical writing on the project and its themes entitled Emotional Cartography 
(2009b). However, despite these project titles, Nold is generally circumspect about the 
claims he makes for his device and repeatedly stresses that the GSR reading is 
meaningless without the active interpretation of the participants. Nold intends his 
technology to stimulate dialogue and reflection in two ways: firstly, about the places 
mapped and the project participants’ affective engagement with them; and secondly, 
about the reality and fantasy of a technology able to plot internal states objectively in 
this way (2009c).
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Nold’s initial intention for the technology was less concerned with mapping 
than with critiquing ‘the currently dominant concept of pervasive technology’, and its 
extension into the space of the body (2009c). He has stated that the cartographic side 
of his project only emerged as a consequence of his experience developing and 
working with the biometric device:
It wasn’t so much that I set out to make these participatory maps, the 
whole idea of doing these collective mappings only grew out of a process. I 
think my main frustration with a lot of art projects is that they have a very 
clear end point, and they don’t iterate, whereas I think in this project I 
developed a small thing, and through that I discovered people who were 
making interesting meaning out of this, and out of that I kind of iterated 
the way it was used and it became something different. Because I did it 
over a period of years it grew into these emotion maps and various other 
contexts. (Conversation with the author, 28 July 2010)
With Bio Mapping, Nold is more concerned with an iterative process than with 
any particular representational outputs. Cartographic theorists have identified a recent 
shift toward performative understandings of mapping rooted in embodied experience 
and practice: Chris Perkins locates these new understandings in the context of ‘a shift 
in the humanities and social sciences from considering texts as the bearers of culture, 
toward performative ways of knowing the world, in which the dynamic aspects of 
culture matter ... the philosophical shift away from representation, toward action’ 
(2009: 126). Perkins identifies artists’ work with cartography as one area in which a 
performative tradition of mapping is being enacted, and singles out art practices 
involving locative media as ‘particularly performative’, using Nold’s work as an 
example of this (2009: 132).
[FIG 1 TO GO AROUND HERE]
Nonetheless, Nold’s practice is still characterised by the attention paid to the 
final form of the mapped output. Even if the emphasis of his large-scale participatory 
projects is on the process and the dialogues engendered, they still result in more-or-
less traditional cartographic representations: paper folding maps which emulate the 
production values and formats of official cartography. For example, the Greenwich 
Emotion Map (Figure 1) is an A0 paper map, the same dimensions as the Ordnance 
Survey’s Explorer series of walking maps and designed to mimic their distinctive 
orange covers. It was, in fact, printed by the Ordnance Survey for the project 
(although its scale was rather larger, at 1:3,530 rather than the Explorer’s 1:25,000) 
(Nold 2006).
Yet although this printed map was produced and distributed at the end of the 
project, it is only one possible form that the data gathered by the project can take; 
Nold has also distributed the data from his Bio Mapping projects via his own website 
or the websites specific to each project, in file formats that that can be readily 
visualised and manipulated in geospatial applications such as Google Earth.6 Perkins 
notes that another way in which performative traditions of cartography are being 
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enacted is in everyday mapping performances that exploit the geospatial web: from 
enthusiasts’ collaborative mappings like the OpenStreetMap project, to the simple use 
of interactive mapping services to produce customised maps for directions or of local 
services (2009).7 Furthermore, although Nold’s paper map comes with the trappings 
of an authoritative representation of space, one with what critical cartographer Denis 
Wood calls ‘the hubris to present the world ... as it really is’ (2010: 26), its plotted 
contents are clearly fleeting and subjective: the routes walked by a limited group of 
participants during the period of the project (October 2005 to March 2006) and the 
events of arousal registered by the GSR sensors worn by those individuals as they 
walked. In terms of the conventional expectations of objectivity and authority in 
cartographic representation, the most that can be said of this data is that in its 
distribution and clustering it might show something of the intersubjective experience 
of intensity in Greenwich for a limited group of people during a defined period.
Mapping Affect
For over a hundred years, researchers working in affective science have 
predominately worked with a dimensional approach to emotion; that is, they argue 
that the distinct commonsense emotions (anger, delight, happiness, sadness and so on) 
are grounded in more basic properties, usually two. Arousal or intensity is one of 
these ‘psychological primitives’ and the other is valence, the hedonic (that is, positive 
or negative) aspect of an emotional response. Together these properties are used as the 
axes of graphs on which all emotional responses can be plotted and described in 
necessary, if not sufficient, terms (Feldman Barrett and Russell 2009; Brosch and 
Moors 2009). 
While GSR is often taken as an index of arousal or intensity, valence is much 
harder to capture in a way that satisfies the scientific requirement for objectivity. 
Nold’s Bio Mapping project also deals with the hedonic axis of emotion but, far from 
striving for an objective measure, he embraces the attitude that ‘you can talk about 
valence in a much more human way, where it’s about the interpretation’ (conversation 
with the author, 28 July 2010). In each project, visualisations of geographic and 
biometric traces are used as the basis of a group workshop in which participants 
narrate their walks and qualify their emotional responses. These initial visualisations 
are distinct from the paper maps produced at the end of each project which combine 
the disclosures collected in the workshops with the traces produced by the Bio 
Mapping device. Nold has stated that ‘the [initial] visualisation of the data only allows 
that discussion to take place. So the end product is the combination of this concious 
[sic] reflection on this “pseudo” scientific data’ (Nold and Bentkowska-Kafel 2006). 
What seems clear from this is that the project’s technological trappings are less to do 
with science and more to do with a certain strategic scientism, and that the value of 
the GSR data for Nold is less in what it represents than what it permits.
However, for all of Nold’s circumspectness regarding the data and the 
technology that underpins his work, and for all of the emphasis that he places on the 
processes and dialogues the technology permits, the GSR data is still an empirical 
index of bodily intensities. There has been a noticeable turn to affect and emotion in 
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the humanities in recent years, dateable back to the mid-1990s.8 In an influential 
essay, Brian Massumi discusses the use of GSR meters in experimental research into 
emotional responses to television programmes (2002: 23–45). He uses the findings of 
one particular experiment as the basis for arguing that intensity of the sort that GSR 
indexes, manifested ‘in the skin – at the surface of the body, at its interface with 
things’ (2002: 25), is a communicative circuit that exists in parallel with what he calls 
‘the determinate qualities of the image’ (2002: 25). GSR indexes its content to 
conventional, intersubjectively understood meanings: language, more or less (this is 
not to say that the two circuits are isolated – Massumi argues that they are capable of 
resonating or interfering with each other). Massumi provisionally equates GSR data to 
affect;9 however, rather than affective science Massumi’s understanding of the 
concept draws far more on Gilles Deleuze’s reading of the seventeenth-century 
philosopher Benedict de Spinoza. This is a key element in Massumi’s attempt to 
rewrite the body into a cultural studies that he argues has excluded it in favour of 
structure and language.10
Deleuze revives the distinction between two Latin terms that translators of 
Spinoza had generally conflated as ‘emotion’: affectus and affectio. Affect (affectus) 
is ‘a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of 
the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s 
capacity to act’ (Massumi 2004: xvii; see also Seigworth 2005). It is the variation of 
intensity of a body, corresponding to an openness to the influence of other bodies and 
capacity to effect change on them, strung out along the line of its life. An affection 
(affectio) is an event of connection between bodies, ‘each such state considered as an 
encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting body’ (Massumi 2004: 
xvii). Affect is virtual rather than actual: it belongs to ‘the pressing crowd of 
incipiencies and tendencies ... [the] realm of potential’ (Massumi 2002: 30). Affect is 
relational, it involves thinking of the body in its virtual aspect as being open to its 
context and the influence of other bodies.
Bodies here should not be thought of as exclusively referring to human bodies. 
In Spinoza’s monism, all of reality is one substance and all entities within it, ideal and 
actual, are considered modes of that substance. As they are all one substance, bodies 
are differentiated from each other first by movement, in terms of relations of motion 
and rest. All of the entities we encounter are compounds, relatively stable 
arrangements of simpler bodies, moving in concert. Bodies are therefore conceived of 
as ‘any whole composed of parts, where these parts stand in some definite relation to 
one another, and has a capacity for being affected by other bodies’ (Baugh 2010: 35). 
Spinoza’s ontology levels the distinction between entities: the category of bodies 
includes human beings and other living things, social bodies at different scales 
(bodies nest within other bodies: there are bodies ‘all the way down’), inanimate 
matter, texts, ideas.
Nold is clear that the GSR readings in his Bio Mapping projects are not 
documenting emotion, ‘but actually a variety of different sensations in relation to the 
external environment such as awareness, sensory perception and surprise’ (2009c: 5). 
7
Likewise Massumi distinguishes between emotion and the intensities that he equates 
with affect:
An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality 
of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. 
Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of 
insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed 
progressions ... into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and 
recognised. (2002: 27–8)
Following Massumi in provisionally equating the intensities indexed by GSR with 
affect, and in splitting affect from emotion, it can be seen that far from simplistically 
mapping emotion, the physiological side of Nold’s device in fact provides the 
grounds for such a mapping which occurs in the group workshops. Each geo-located 
peak of intensity is an affection, in the terminology Massumi and Deleuze derive from 
Spinoza. Seen in this way, the narratives and discussions opened up by the GSR data 
relate to the bodies and lives of the participants in their virtual aspects, in all their 
openness and connections, and produce a social understanding of space.
In his statement on the Greenwich Emotion Map, Nold notes that it works on 
three different levels:
At a basic level, the map shows a sensory space of embodied 
experience ... At another level, we seem to see the effects of the built 
environment represented by traffic crossings and comments about 
particular local features. But perhaps most striking is the prominence of a 
third level: that of people’s social interaction. This social space – which 
might be seen as ephemeral and temporary, including as it does surprise 
meetings with friends, neighbours and strangers – appears to be more 
important than the other levels. (Nold 2006)
If we accept Massumi’s equation of the intensities registered by GSR sensors with a 
Deleuzian/Spinozan concept of affect, then the prominence of the social in the outputs 
from Nold’s Bio Mapping is inevitable. Describing the way that affect has been 
understood in human geography, Steve Pile notes that it ‘is not simply personal or 
inter-personal ... it is transpersonal, drawing in many bodies. Affect, then, is both 
within and between bodies’ (2009: 8). The phenomenon mapped by Nold’s device and 
used as the basis of a mapping of emotion is, Massumi argues, part of a ‘field of 
emergence’ (the virtual) that is ‘open-endedly social’ (2002: 9). 
Bio Mapping and the Social
Nold states that media interest in his device in the mid-2000s led to him fielding 
enquiries about his device from parties ranging from academic researchers to 
individuals seeking new therapeutic devices and commercial concerns:
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Estate agents in California wanting an insight into the geographical 
distribution of desire; car companies wanting to look at drivers’ stress, 
doctors trying to re-design their medical offices, as well as advertising 
agencies wanting to emotionally re-brand whole cities ... I was shocked: 
my device, or more correctly, the idea or fantasy of my device had struck 
a particular 21st century zeitgeist. (Nold 2009c: 4)
Nold’s discomfort with some of these approaches prompted him to seek to 
define his own vision of Bio Mapping as a socially engaged art practice: this involved 
shifting the emphasis of the project away from the device itself toward developing 
and documenting ‘a reflexive and participatory methodology’ (Nold 2009c: 4). The 
key to this development was a shift to a community-based practice. From the project’s 
inception in 2004 to 2006, Bio Mapping was mainly exhibited in group shows in art 
gallery contexts, involving casual participants. These were generally drawn from 
audiences with a specific interest in contemporary or new media art rather than those 
with a particular stake in the place being mapped.11
In contrast, for the Greenwich Emotion Map project, Nold worked for six 
months (October 2005 to March 2006) with a total of 50 local residents, holding 
weekly group workshops. After Greenwich, Nold concentrated on longer projects in 
which he worked with communities. Distinguishing between these two phases of the 
project, Nold notes that there was a much richer engagement with the task in the latter 
group:
It started becoming about the local development and how people felt 
about it, it became about the history, it became about the individual 
personal stories, whereas when you did it in the centre of town it was 
often about incidents, you know, fell over, dog poo, raining, ice cream, had 
a burger, saw somebody attractive. (Conversation with the author, 28 July 
2010)
Nold’s methodology has two characteristics that bear mentioning. Firstly, the 
interpretation and narration of the traces happens after the walk itself: Nold 
considered and rejected the use of real time data early on in the project.12 This 
contrasts with many other locative media participatory mapping projects, such as 
Esther Polak’s Amsterdam RealTime (2002) and Jen Hamilton and Jen Southern’s 
Running Stitch series (2006–9), which used real time data. Secondly, while these other 
mapping projects all involved central, visual foci in the form of projected maps in 
gallery spaces, the Greenwich Emotion Map was more about creating a particular type 
of situation for its participants, described by Tom Corby as ‘an open-ended discursive 
event whereby meanings emerge from the shared subjective responses of groups of 
users’ (2008: 465). In Nold’s Bio Mapping projects, participants describe and discuss 
their subjective bodily data as a group:
At the beginning I was doing them one-to-one, and actually it’s not so 
interesting, it’s much more interesting when you hear a group of people 
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who are all experts in the local area, and one person who is with a group 
of people that they don’t know suddenly is happy to talk about their quite 
personal experiences, including fairly intimate ideas of themselves and 
quite political ideas. So there’s originally a collectivity in the way that we 
gather the data and bring it together. (Conversation with the author, 28 
July 2010)
Nold thinks of the Bio Mapping tool as a ‘performative technology’ in two 
ways: firstly, it allows people to walk and experience their localities as performances, 
rendering the familiar strange through the knowledge that this prosthesis is making 
their intimate body states legible for a future audience. Secondly, in the workshops, 
the device and the quasi-scientific affect data that it has produced work to mediate 
social relationships between strangers whose only connection may be a mutual 
relationship with the area being mapped. Nold states that the device
shoulders the burden of having to hold the public’s attention, while 
offering a safe distance from public exposure to the ‘interpreter’. Used in 
this way, the tool allows people who have never met each other to tell 
elaborate descriptions of their own experiences, as well their [sic] opinions 
on the local neighbourhood, in a way that they would have never done 
otherwise. (Nold 2009c: 6)
‘Community’ is a term that often comes freighted with essentialising and 
conservative assumptions relating to place and identity, even when it is used in 
supposedly progressive art practices. Writing in the mid 2000s, Claire Bishop 
identified a ‘social turn’ in art, a ‘recent surge of artistic interest in collectivity, 
collaboration, and direct engagement with specific social constituencies’ which has 
gone under many names (2006: 178). Extending critiques of imposed, monumental 
and elitist public art first developed through site-specific practices during the 1970s, 
artists working within these participatory genres use ‘social situations to produce 
dematerialised, anti-market, politically engaged projects that carry on the modernist 
call to blur art and life’ (Bishop 2006: 179). 
Christian Kravagna has described how different strands of participatory art, 
while sharing the background Bishop describes, vary considerably in the way they 
conceive of the communities that are their rationale and medium, noting that ‘some 
understand the community as pre-existent and, therefore, tend to attribute a (fixed) 
identity to it … [while] for others, community is a temporary phenomenon with a 
potential for development that emerges in the course of the project’ (2010: 254). In a 
related discussion, Bishop has critiqued the concept of community operative in 
artworks from the relational aesthetics genre that emerged during the 1990s,13 which, 
although not framed as public art, are similarly participatory and concerned with 
reaffirming social relations: ‘an ideal of subjectivity as whole and of community as 
immanent togetherness’ (2004: 67). Bishop argues instead for participatory art 
practices that expose antagonistic currents in society, these being the true basis of a 
pluralist democracy.
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Locative media is certainly not immune from essentialist ideas of community. 
Sean Cubitt, generalising from a description of Urban Tapestries (2002–4), a ‘public 
authoring’ locative media project which allowed participants to annotate their 
environment with notes and narratives (Proboscis 2002), states that:
There is undoubtedly a nostalgic tinge to this type of locative art, a belief 
that in some way a mythicised urban community might be brought into 
being on the basis of a tradition that is not only lost but invented, and that 
meaningful places might supplant the meaning-free spaces which have 
become our lot. (Cubitt 2010: 167)
The concept of community operational in Nold’s Bio Mapping projects is anti-
essentialist, with a temporary and limited collective emerging through the framework 
of his methodology and the mediation of his ‘performative technology’. It is also far 
from homogeneous, being open to the antagonist currents that Bishop describes. The 
supporting text for the Brentford Biopsy project (2008) explains that:
The texts on the map are those of multiple voices often disagreeing with 
each other or speaking from different points of view, but always trying to 
make sense of their environment ... its central aim is to hold up the 
complex network of local issues for all to see and reflect upon and not to 
attempt to untangle or resolve them. (Nold and Boraschi 2009: 85)
[FIG 2 TO GO ABOUT HERE]
Nold’s Cartography
Nold has visualised the trace data from his Bio Mapping projects in different ways, 
employing various technologies. In his earliest projects, from 2004, he used scanned 
paper maps as a base map and visualised participants’ routes simply, with coloured 
dots for each log of arousal and location. In later projects he has used Google Earth, 
plotting geographic and biometric data as one line, with the GSR data replacing the 
vertical (altitude) datum of GPS (Figure 2).
The aerial photography layer of Google Maps acts as a base map, tilted to an 
oblique bird’s-eye view so that each route appears as a jagged, three dimensional 
graph of arousal. Equating affect to the bodily intensities indexed by GSR, these 
visualisations can be taken as referring specifically to affectus as ‘a line of continuous 
variation in the passage of intensities’ (Seigworth 2005: 166) and ‘a gradient of bodily 
capacity [to affect and be affected]’ (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 2). The jaggedness 
of this line is the result of the GPS side of Nold’s device logging location punctually, 
every four seconds. But this technical limitation notwithstanding, the combined 
geographic/physiological line is also a record of punctual events of encounter between 
bodies – affections (affectio), actualisations of the virtual, ‘affect turned effect’ 
(Seigworth 2005: 166). As Nold says of his participants:
While I would see just a fairly random spiky trail, they saw an intimate 
document of their journey, and recounted events which encompassed the 
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full breadth of life: precarious traffic crossings, encounters with friends, 
meeting people they fancied, or the nervousness of walking past the 
house of an ex-partner. (Nold 2009c: 5)
These three-dimensional visualisations are generally used in the workshop 
phases of Nold’s projects, but his later community-focussed Bio Mapping projects 
have, as I have discussed above, also involved the production of a final visualisation 
in the form of a paper map. The cartography for these maps has varied from project to 
project, both stylistically and in terms of content: for example the Stockport Emotion 
Map (Nold 2007) (Figure 3)14 includes sketches produced by the participants 
representing issues they associated with that town. However the maps also vary in the 
way they represent the two different datasets produced by the Bio Mapping device. 
While a line representing the participants’ routes is present in both the Greenwich 
Emotion Map (Nold 2006) and the Stockport Emotion Map, it is absent from the San 
Francisco Emotion Map (2007) (Figures 4 and 5): here the street plan of the Mission 
District is picked out only in discontinuous arousal readings. Whereas both the 
Stockport and San Francisco maps represent the GSR readings as points, the 
Greenwich Emotion Map uses a rather different approach: a geographic information 
system was used ‘to create a communal arousal surface which blended together 80 
people’s arousal data and annotations’ (Nold 2009c: 7). 
[FIGS 3-5 TO GO AROUND HERE]
This aggregation has implications, the most obvious being that the identity of 
the individual is subordinated to a collective identity where affect is concerned, if not 
in their movement. The Greenwich Emotion Map deals with the arousal data 
statistically: the GSR readings that stand in for the elevation datum of GPS are used to 
create a contour map of affect. Individuals are dissolved into isolines linking similar 
arousal readings. While the later maps do not follow this particular approach, they all 
anonymise the affective responses and thus dissolve the identities of individual 
participants in a collective. While the San Francisco Emotion Map seems to provide a 
thick aggregation of individual affections, in fact, each dot is a statistical average: the 
map’s accompanying text states that ‘the overall pattern of dots shows where the 
participants walked. The color of the dots represents the combined emotional data of 
all the participants’ (Nold 2007). Even where spikes corresponding to individual 
responses are shown, as with the Stockport Emotion Map, the textual annotations 
which qualify those readings float free, without named authors. In all the maps, the 
GSR readings are unconnected to the lines denoting the routes taken by individual 
participants. Where the linear traces of movement have been removed altogether, 
leaving only a discontinuous distribution of intensities (as with the San Francisco 
Emotion Map), the sense of the dissolution of the individual subject is even more 
marked. 
For Nold, the representation of a particular individual’s movement and 
affective response is less important than bringing together the many traces, in his 
workshops, in order to form a collective representation of place. The way in which 
Nold represents bodily intensities in his maps purposefully attenuates any connection 
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to specific participants. This subordination of individual subjectivity evident in his 
maps can be interpreted in terms of a Deleuzian/Spinozan concept of affect as 
‘prepersonal intensity’ (Massumi 2004: xvii). These paper maps also suggest the 
possibility of locating affect outside the body, in virtual relations and circulations. 
Massumi states that ‘the autonomy of affect is its participation in the virtual. Its  
autonomy is its openness. Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes 
confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is’ 
(2002: 35). This openness to the virtual is also the possibility of change: these maps 
are therefore not representations of a static concept of what constitutes a place; rather, 
they are snapshots of place as an affective system, relational and always emerging.
Nold’s Bio Mapping and Deleuze’s Cartography
To recap, Nold’s cartography plots two kinds of contents: the extensive movement of 
participants’ bodies through space, rendered as a line by GPS; and events of 
physiological arousal, intensities that I have argued here can be interpreted in terms of 
affect rather than emotion, and a Deleuzian/Spinozan concept of affect in particular. 
But Deleuze has also discussed bodies and affective relations in terms that are directly 
relevant to Nold’s practice. In his own writing and in his collaboration with Felix 
Guattari, Deleuze proposes a cartographic model for subjectivity or individuation, as 
Moira Gatens describes:
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza posits a ‘social cartography’, a means by 
which to map individuals on a plane of immanence [i.e. reality considered 
in its virtual aspect]. The coordinates comprise two major axes whose 
points of intersection offer an analysis in terms of intensive capacities and 
extensive relations. (Gatens 1996: 168)
In one use of Deleuze’s cartographic model in his collaboration with Felix 
Guattari, these axes are referred to as longitude (‘the sum total of material elements 
belonging to [a body] ... under given relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness’) and latitude (‘the sum total of the intensive affects [a body] ... is capable of 
at a given power or degree of potential’) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 287).15 Gatens 
states that taken together, longitude and latitude ‘provide an immanent appraisal of 
any given body rather than a taxonomic reading’ (1996: 168). Rather than assessing a 
body in terms of what type of thing it is, we can assess it in terms of its relations: the 
internal ones, the quasi-stable arrangement of extensive elements which comprise a 
physical body; and its external ones, its variable capacity to affect and be affected 
(affectus, using the distinction introduced earlier). The two axes of this Deleuzian 
cartography are evident in the literally cartographic traces produced by Nold’s device, 
as is best demonstrated in the oblique Google Earth visualisations of individual traces, 
where ongoing variations in affect are rendered as contours.
However, as I have already stressed, the bodies of Deleuzian/Spinozan affect 
theory are not restricted to the human. Deleuze and Guattari co-opt a word from 
medieval philosophy, ‘haecceity’ (literally, thisness), to describe a ‘mode of 
13
individuation’ distinct from object, subject or a definition in terms of a fundamental 
substance’ (2004: 287). The examples they initially provide are all temporal unities: ‘a 
season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking 
nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject’ 
(2004: 287–8). Haecceities are not simply events and locations expressed as 
coordinates in time and space, ‘emplacements’ as Deleuze and Guattari put it: they are 
affective bodies in their own right, ‘concrete individuations that have a status of their 
own and direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects’ (2004: 288). The affections 
distributed about Nold’s maps are not just physiological effects in the bodies of his 
participants, they are also the latitudes of diverse other bodies: pitbulls, panhandlers 
and parks, as well as physical places associated with the memories of friends and 
former lovers (all these examples are taken from Figure 5).
In closing his 2006 survey of locative media arts, Drew Hemment puts 
forward Deleuze and Guattari’s haecceities as a concept to which the genre could 
aspire (2006). He is referring mainly to the annotative strand of locative media; those 
works that involve placing and accessing site-specific digital media contents using a 
geographic coordinate system.16 Too often, he argues, works of this sort involve 
emplacements in Deleuze and Guattari’s negative sense: discrete contents located in a 
space reduced to the strictly cartographic dimensions of longitude and latitude. If 
locative art is ‘to exceed the sterile precision of its own axiomatic system’ (Hemment 
2006: 354), its practitioners need to conceive of their interventions as haecceities:
Locative arts can then come to be seen not as distanced from the world 
but as offering a potential for transformation and engagement, opening up 
other places, their contents circulating through location-aware networks, 
producing a field of relations and affects. (Hemment 2006: 354)
However, in likening the sited digital contents of annotative locative art to haecceities 
in this way, Hemment neglects the bigger ontological implications of the concept: if 
the plane of immanence, the world, is composed of such individuations, then the 
human bodies walking through and experiencing these affections are themselves 
haecceities. As Deleuze and Guattari state:
We must avoid an oversimplified conciliation, as though there were on the 
one hand formed subjects, of the thing or person type, and on the other 
hand spatiotemporal coordinates of the haecceity type. For you will yield 
nothing to haecceities unless you realize that that is what you are, and 
that you are nothing but that. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 289)
Seen in terms of Deleuze’s concept of affect and his cartographic model for 
individuation, Nold’s maps depict just this: haecceities yielding to haecceities. The 
two distinct kinds of trace captured by Nold’s device, geographic and physiological, 
in fact index fundamentally similar phenomena, graphed along their longitudinal and 
latitudinal axes respectively. Elsewhere, in another use of his cartographic model, 
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Deleuze makes it clear: ‘Each of the two types of maps, those of trajectories and those 
of affects, refers to the other’ (1998: 65). All of the marks on Nold’s maps testify to 
bodies moving and being moved, whether they are those of the Bio Mapping 
participants or those (human or non-human) bodies that affect them.
From Nold’s use of GSR readings, we have come to a Deleuzian/Spinozan 
interpretation of affect. However, in closing I am going to address my own use of 
affect theory in this discussion of Nold’s work. Like Nold, I have tried to be 
circumspect, not least about Massumi’s equation of the intensities registered by GSR 
with affect in the Deleuzian/Spinozan sense – at least I have tried to make it clear that 
it is Massumi’s equation and that I am working with it provisionally.
Massumi begins and validates his essay with an appeal to empirical cognitive 
science into emotional responses and, as I have described, GSR is indeed used by 
scientists in this way, and has been for over a century. But I have some concern about 
this easy bridging of disciplinary domains. There is no agreed definition of affect in 
the affective sciences, just as there are different strands of social and cultural affect 
theory (Charland 2009; Thrift 2004). Although Massumi’s separation of signals into 
affective and semantic/semiotic levels draws some support from the long-used 
dimensional approach to emotion (its separation into intensity/arousal and valence), 
these bipartite models are formally similar rather than identical.
My position is that there is no need to equate the dimensional model of 
affective science to the parallel circuits of linguistic meaning and physiological 
intensities: one can take the point that emotion is a qualified intensity without this 
appeal to science, just as one can accept that language is not the only way we are 
moved to action. Massumi’s use of GSR in his essay opens up a space to talk about 
the body’s openness to context and change by ranging across affect’s disciplinary 
registers. There is a parallel here with Nold’s use of GSR, which opens up a social 
space for hitherto unconnected individuals to collectively map their shared milieus. 
These are both strategic scientisms.
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1. Massumi’s 1995 essay, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’, is often identified as a foundational text in a Deleuzian/Spinozan 
strand of affect theory in the humanities. It is reprinted in Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect,  
Sensation (2002).
2. Claire Bishop succinctly describes this phenomenon: ‘Reducing art to statistical information about target audiences 
and “performance indicators”, the [New Labour] Government prioritizes social effect over considerations of artistic 
quality’ (2006: 180). Sophie Hope has discussed Nold’s work in relation to this policy context (2008).
3. In an elaborate diagram hosted on his website, Nold sets out his understanding of related and competing concepts of 
collective identity in contemporary society, and the different actors involved in mobilising and promoting them. While 
Nold dismisses stable, place-bound and unconflicted collective identities as a fantasy, what he calls the ‘cuddly 
community’, he notes the vital role that this fantasy plays in providing the practical conditions under which his own 
work comes about (available at Nold 2011 [‘Concept’]).
4. Nold states that the Chartists claimed a figure of six million signatures; the government, after a rapid count, came up 
with only 1,975,496 signatures, of which many were clearly fictional (2005: 846–8).
5. All the ‘Emotion Map’ projects are linked to from the Emotion Map website (Nold 2008).
6. Nold has made the data available in KMZ (suitable for Google Earth) and GPX file formats.
7. This example of a performative mapping practice perhaps misses the point that the data interactively manipulated 
and selectively viewed, as well as the structure of that data, is still a representation rather than a performance; however, 
Perkins still sees these technologies as producing a performative understanding of maps.
8. See for example the essays collected in Jean Halley and Patricia Ticineto Clough’s anthology The Affective Turn:  
Theorizing the Social (2007) and Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth’s The Affect Theory Reader (2010).
9. Given the contested nature of affect, it seems fair to cite Massumi verbatim: ‘For present purposes, intensity will be 
equated with affect’ (2002: 27). In ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ at least, he does not trouble that equation. It is significant 
that Massumi chooses two empirical studies to introduce a largely philosophical treatment of affect, which draws far 
more substantially on Deleuze, Spinoza and Henri Bergson than it does on cognitive science. Nigel Thrift, writing at a 
time when the considerable impact of Massumi’s article was clear and seemingly with it in mind, notes that, in writing 
on affect in social and cultural theory in the early 2000s, ‘naturalism and scientism are no longer seen as terrible sins’ 
(2004: 59).
10. Clare Hemmings notes that Massumi and another key writer of the affective turn, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, both 
fail to provide any specifics about exactly which parts of post-structuralism and which writers are responsible for the 
disembodied impasse which they claim has befallen cultural theory. Hemmings argues that this lack of citation or 
specific engagement is a vital part of their project of positioning affect and ontology (over post-structuralist 
epistemology) as ‘the critical new for the noughts’ (2005: 556).
11. Amongst other exhibitions, this phase of the Bio Mapping project travelled with the touring exhibition Day-to-Day 
Data (Harrison 2005).
12. ‘When I was developing this whole thing I kind of started from various kinds of sensors and of course it’s easy to 
get real time data out of it, and to begin with I was playing with real time data, but I made a deliberate choice to do it as 
this kind of post-reflection’: Christian Nold in conversation with the author, 28 July 2010.
13. Relational aesthetics is a term coined by the French curator Nicholas Bourriaud to describe a group of mainly 
continental European artists that emerged during the 1990s (Bourriaud 2002).
14. A collaboration with designer Daniela Boraschi.
15. Longitude and latitude are not terms that Spinoza uses. Elsewhere, Deleuze states that he takes them from medieval 
philosophy: ‘In short, if we are Spinozists we will not define a thing by its form, nor by its organs and its functions, nor 
as a substance or a subject. Borrowing terms from the Middle Ages, or from geography, we will define it by longitude 
and latitude’ (Deleuze 1988: 127).
16. The distinction between tracing and annotative strands of locative media comes from Marc Tuters and Kazys 
Varnelis (2006).
